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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Boddie v. Connecticut: Whither The
Indigent Civil Litigant?
The recognition of the rights of the indigent in civil proceedings appears to
be following a trail parallel to that blazed in the criminal area. In the recent
case of Boddie v. Connecticut,' the Supreme Court struck down a Connec-
ticut statute2 which required pre-payment of court and service costs as a
prerequisite to access to the court in divorce proceedings. The actual holding
of the case was that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment dictate that where a state exercises complete control
over the dissolution of a marriage, due process is thwarted if access to the
only forum available for resolution of the dispute is denied merely because
of inability to pay. The real significance of this decision lies in its obvious
invitation for expansion, and in the fact that this is the first time that the
Court has held the right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases to be
constitutionally guaranteed. This article will attempt to explore the develop-
ment of the civil in forma pauperis doctrine to date, and the prospects for
its expansion in the future.
History
Federal Courts
In the past, the federal In Forma Pauperis statute has been the only basis
for allowing the indigent to so proceed.2 Prior to the Boddie decision, most
federal courts construed the statute to mean that the ability to proceed in
1. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). This case was recently discussed in Prisco, Boddie and
Beyond: Rights of the Indigent Civil Litigant, 18 CATHOLIC LAW 67 (1972). That arti-
cle deals mainly with the constitutional basis for Boddie, vis-a-vis the criminal access
to the court doctrine. The instant article will deal mainly with the reaction of state
and federal courts to the Boddie decision, and the prospects for expansion of the
Boddie doctrine into hitherto unexplored fields.
2. CONN. GEN. STATS. § 52-259 (1958).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
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forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right. 4 Johnson v. United States5 was
one of the first intimations by the Supreme Court that this "privilege" might
indeed be a right. Prior to Johnson the rule had been that if the trial court
gave a written certification that an attempted appeal was not taken "in good
faith" there could be no in forma pauperis appeal.6 The Court in Johnson
held that the trial court's certification was not final; the litigant had a right
to appeal in forma pauperis the certification itself. Subsequent cases have
confirmed that, at least in criminal cases, such a procedure is constitution-
ally mandated. 7 After the right to proceed in forma pauperis was secured
in the criminal context, the lower federal courts were divided as to whether
the doctrine should be extended. In habeas corpus cases, technically civil
in nature but closely related to criminal actions, the courts were usually will-
ing to recognize the right.a
The in forma pauperis principle in civil proceedings has been acknowl-
edged for more than a century but has been referred to only occasionally
and has never been applied. For example, the fourteenth amendment was
developed from social theory codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (now
42 U.S.C. § 1981) which provides for equal access to all courts, civil or
criminal.9 And in 1884, the Supreme Court said in Barbier v. Connally'0
that the fourteenth amendment requires "[t]hat [persons] should have like
access to the courts . . . [t]hat no greater burdens should be laid upon one
than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition."" More than
80 years later, in the 1966 case of Williams v. Shaffer,' 2 dissenting from a
denial of certiorari, Mr. Justice Douglas said: ". . . [T]he Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal prosecutions.
Its protections extend as well to civil matters."'1 3 However, so far as the fed-
4. Dorsey v. Gill, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 9, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Parsell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1955);
Barkeij v. Ford Motor Co., 230 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Clough v. Hunter, 191 F.2d
516 (10th Cir. 1951).
5. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957).
6. Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257 (1943); Dorsey v. Gill, 80 U.S. App.
D.C. 9, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Bernstein
v. United States, 195 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952).
7. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367,
(1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192
(1966).
8. Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1962); Tidmore v. Taylor, 323 F.2d 88
(10th Cir. 1963); Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965); Pembrook v.
Wilson, 370 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1966).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
10. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
11. Id. at 31.
12. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (Douglas, J. dissenting), denying
cert. to 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
13. Id. at 1039.
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eral circuit courts of appeal were concerned, the Justice was a "voice crying
in the wilderness." They preferred to follow the judicial attitude which had
persisted since the turn of the century: that the in forma pauperis proceed-
ing does not apply to civil cases.
State Courts
The doctrine of civil in forma pauperis proceedings has been more widely
recognized and applied at the state court level than at the federal. This
state recognition has been based on statutory, common law, and constitu-
tional grounds and applies to a wide variety of civil situations. Most of the
states have considered the in forma pauperis proceeding to be a privilege,
but a substantial number have held it to be a right.
A 1968 New York14 case foreshadowed the Supreme Court's decision in
Boddie and based its decision on the same constitutional ground. "In this
State, a marriage cannot be dissolved except by 'due judicial proceedings'.
• .. The loss of access to the courts in an action for divorce is a right of
substantial magnitude when only through the courts may redress or relief be
obtained. Such a right is . . .as basic as Griffin's right to appeal and Mrs.
Harper's right to vote. It is manifestly discriminatory under Griffin stand-
ards to deprive Mrs. Jeffreys of that right while affording it to others with
money."' 5
In a recent Maine case,1 involving a tenant eviction, the indigent de-
fendant was unable to post the bond which a Maine statute required before
claimant was allowed to defend title to the property. The court found the
statutory requirement to be a denial of due process saying, "[tihe constitu-
tional mandate [of Equal Protection] does not differentiate between civil
and criminal cases."' 17
However, most states have not based the ability to proceed civilly in
forma pauperis on constitutional grounds, but rather have utilized statutory
authorization or the inherent power of the court to implement this doctrine.
As early as 1856, the Texas Supreme Court 8 held that it had the power,
with or without an applicable statute, to waive costs and fees in a civil as-
sault and battery case. A Pennsylvania court in 190119 held that a require-
14. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
On appeal, the court decided that, while the city was not required to pay costs, the
state was so required, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972).
15. 58 Misc. 2d at 1158, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
16. Harrington v. Harrington, 269 A.2d 310 (1970).
17. Id. at 314.
18. Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 577 (1856).
19. Jack v. Adm'rs of McClure, 26 Pa. County Ct. 59 (1901).
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ment of security for costs was a denial of justice to a pauper. In State ex rel.
Jennings v. Peacock,20 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a defendant
tenant need not post security to recompense jurors because ". . where a
trial by jury may be invoked the right to such trial is absolute and a defend-
ant . . .may look with confidence to the guarantee . . . and demand a
trial by jury although he is penniless and without friends."'21
Cost-free transcripts have long been available to civil indigents in some
states, although the courts have generally explained this policy on the basis
that court reporters are state officials and required to provide the record,
even though they are ordinarily recompensed for their services by the liti-
gants.2 2  In Louisiana, transcripts are provided by statute without cost in
civil cases. 23
In Ferguson v. Keays,2 4 decided just prior to Boddie, the California Su-
preme Court considered whether the state courts of appeal had the power
to waive the fees required for filing the record on appeal in a civil case, or
for a petition for a writ within their original jurisdiction. The court con-
cluded that they did have such power. A long line of California cases had
previously held that the trial courts have the right, derived from the com-
mon law, to waive certain fees for indigent litigants. 25  Based on this line
of cases, the court found that several English common law decisions ex-
tended the power to the courts in appeals cases. 26 Since American courts
have traditionally wielded the same powers as their English ancestors, 27 the
court found that it was empowered to waive appeals fees; without this power
the appellate courts would be powerless to prevent abuse at the trial level.
It is clear that the states have been much more innovative and inclusive
than the federal courts in their application of the civil in forma pauperis doc-
trine. But after Boddie, we may see the federal courts begin to seize the
initiative in this area.
20. 126 Fla. 743, 171 So. 821 (1937).
21. Id. at 745, 171 So. at 821-22.
22. Sills v.Sills, 51 Idaho 299, 6 P.2d 1026 (1931); Walker v. Burgevin, 220 Ky. 690,
295 S.W. 997 (1927).
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 5185 (Slovenko 1961).
24. 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
25. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917); Isrin v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320, 403 P.2d 728 (1965) (jury fees); Majors v,
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 2d 235, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1968) (bond on appeal);
Bank of America v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 757, 63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1907)
(cost bond); County of Sutter v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424
(1966) (Cost bond).
26. See, e.g., Drennan v. Andrews, 1 Ch. App. 300, 301, n.7 (1866).
27. See generally note 24 supra.
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Prospects for Expansion
Because Boddie held that cost-free access to the civil courts can be, under
certain circumstances, constitutionally mandated, opportunities for expan-
sion of the doctrine are almost limitless. In light of the Boddie reasoning, it
can be argued that in any situation in which a court, or similar institution,
is the only means of either redress for a grievance or the granting of a right,
access to that court or institution is a matter of constitutional guarantee. In
the short time which has elapsed since the Boddie decision, attorneys have
already attempted to expand the doctrine in several areas.
Federal
In a district court case, In re Smith,28 decided only a few days prior to Bod-
die, the petitioner appealed a decision of a referee in bankruptcy denying
her petition to proceed in forma pauperis on the theory that she was being
denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The referee had
held that the bankruptcy statute29 expressly required payment of the filing
fee as a condition precedent to a discharge in bankruptcy. The district
court agreed with the referee but felt that such a statutory requirement was
a denial of equal protection. While expressing doubt that the "right" to be
declared a bankrupt is as "fundamental" as voting,30 or the right to a free
transcript in a criminal appeal,31 the court felt that the issue before it was
access to the court. On this basis, the court held that a bankruptcy proceed-
ig is more "administrative" than "judicial,"'3 2 but is the type of proceeding
which is ". . . stamped with a judicial imprimatur,"33 thus falling into the
"access to the court" scheme in the broad sense. 84 After the Boddie deci-
sion, the bankruptcy proceeding appears to be fertile ground for the expan-
sion of the civil in forma pauperis doctrine since it is the only means one has
to be declared a bankrupt. This reasoning was followed in In re Aaron,35
where the court based its opinion squarely on Boddie. Specifically, the
court found that "the government's purely economic justification for bank-
ruptcy filing fees is not a sufficiently compelling interest to make such fees
a precondition of access to the courts." 86
28. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
29. 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(b), (c)(8); 68(c)(1); 95(g) (1970).
30. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
31. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32. In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185, 1197 (1st Cir. 1970).
33. In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1089 (D. Colo. 1971).
34. A year earlier, in In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), the First Cir-
cuit dismissed just such an argument.
35. In re Aaron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971).
36. Id. at 1151. The court also found the fundamental interest. "I find from the
1973]
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In Boyden v. Comm'r of Patent Appeals, 7 decided two weeks after Bod-
die, the United States Court of Appeals rejected the denial of equal protec-
tion argument. In that case, the petitioner, asserting indigence, demanded
that his patent appeal be reviewed by the patent commissioner without pay-
ment of the statutory filing fee. Boyden claimed that the federal In Forma
Pauperis Statute38 authorized him to appear before the Patent Office without
paying the fee. The court noted that the statute applies only to the courts,
which can only authorize in forma pauperis proceedings "therein" and does
not apply to administrative tribunals. The court decided that the Congress
has the exclusive power, derived from the Constitution, 9 over patents, and
has opened the Patent Office to all with the not unreasonable requirement
that all pay the filing fee. It is true there are economic differences among
the populace but Congress in its discretion has done nothing to alleviate the
plight of the indigent in this area. The court felt that Boyden had asked
for what was, in effect, a "reverse discrimination." "This applicant in effect
has asked this court to order discrimination in his favor. He asks to be per-
mitted without charge to do what all others must pay for. Thus, where the
law has not discriminated against him, he would have us say that the Com-
missioner is bound to discriminate to his advantage." '40
The court further stated, in dictum, that although the Commissioner had
no statutory power to waive the fee, if he did have the power and failed to
exercise it the result might be different. The court appears to have based
its decision on the fact that in the case at bar Boyden was seeking a "com-
mercial" right (i.e. a patent monopoly) whereas in other cases a "funda-
mental" right was being sought, e.g. the right to counsel,41 the right to a
transcript, 42 the right to vote, 43 or the right to a judgment prior to wage gar-
nishment.44
The Sixth Circuit has also adopted this "fundamental" right approach.
In Chidsey v. Guerin,45 the Secretary of Agriculture issued a reparation order
present record both a prohibitive fee (for the poor), as well as a fundamental interest
which the fee requirement denies those who cannot meet it. Even if the wealth bar-
rier is not, alone, suspect enough to warrant application of the compelling-interest
test, that test is appropriate when the government seeks to exclude a citizen from the
courts because of that person's poverty." Id. Cf. Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Wisc. 1972); O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972).
37. Boyden v. Comm'r of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
39. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
40. Boyden v. Comm'r of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
43. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
44. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
45. 443 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1971).
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against the defendant, whose appeal was dismissed for failure to post the
statutorily required bond. The court held that this was not a deprivation
of due process and interpreted Boddie to hold that only if the interest af-
fected is "fundamental" is the legislature restricted in providing access to the
means for adjudication. "If the affected interest is not considered to be a
fundamental right, due process demands only that Congressional circumspec-
tion of the interest have some 'rational basis'."' 46  The court felt that even
though the defendant's license would be suspended for two to three years,
thereby cutting off his employment opportunities in his profession, this inter-
est was not so fundamental as divorce, 47 interstate travel, 48 voting,49 a writ
of habeas corpus,50 or appellate review of criminal convictions. 5 ' This is
a position with which, as we shall see, some Supreme Court Justices, notably
Messrs. Justice Black and Douglas, do not agree.
Thus, while the federal courts have been reluctant as of yet to expand
the civil in forma pauperis doctrine to include administrative proceedings,
such as those involved in bankruptcy and patent cases, they may have to re-
assess past decisions as more and more attorneys press the demands of the
indigent in these areas. In accordance with the Boddie rationale, it would
seem that indigents with fundamental rights, which are capable of being set-
tled only in federal tribunals, whether judicial or administrative, should be
allowed cost-free access to those arenas.
State
The states appear more willing to adopt and expand the Boddie rationale
than the lower federal courts.
New York, which even prior to Boddie had court access decisions favor-
able to indigents, has expanded the rationale to service of process. In Dor-
sey v. City of New York,5 2 a divorce action, the petitioner moved for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and for an order permitting service by publica-
tion. Since the whereabouts of the petitioner's husband were unknown, she
could not gain access to the court except by service upon him by publication,
which she could not afford. The court held that payment for the service
by publication must be made from the public purse, for "[i]n the absence of
any sufficient justification for the State's action, the failure of the community
46. Id. at 586.
47. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
49. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
50. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52. 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
1973]
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to extend the opportunity to be heard to the indigent is a denial of due proc-
ess [citation omitted]."55
New York also extended the doctrine to abortion cases. In City of New
York v. Wyman 54 the court, using the "complete state control" approach,
expanded the Boddie decision to cover medicaid payments. Under the New
York statute, 55 the state, upon request of the mother and with the consent
of a doctor, freely authorized abortions during the first twenty-four weeks
of pregnancy. Respondents in the case were pregnant women contesting the
constitutionality of a ruling of the Commissioner of Social Services 6 which
"in effect said that there would be no reimbursement by way of medicaid
payments for an abortion unless it was 'medically indicated'. '5 7  Since the
indigent women could not afford the abortions without medicaid assistance,
the court held that the ruling discriminated against the poor and denied
them equal protection.
The court looked to a long line of cases, including Griffin v. Illinois"8 and
Douglas v. California,59 which held that while a state may not be constitu-
tionally required to extend a right to its citizens, once it does so the right
must be extended to all citizens equally. The effect of the Commissioner's
ruling in this case was to deny abortions to the poor while allowing them to
the rich. Because the state had a monopoly on the means by which the
right might be exercised, the indigents had to be afforded an opportunity
to exercise their right without cost. Since at least two three-judge federal
courts have declared state anti-abortion laws unconstitutional 60 as a denial
to women of the "fundamental right," protected by the ninth amendment,
to decide whether or not to have children, it would appear that other states
may be compelled to afford free abortions to all indigent women.
In a New York landlord-tenant case, 61 the court held that the indigent
respondent was constitutionally entitled to service of subpoenae upon wit-
53. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). It would seem that, in accordance with Boddie,
there can be no sufficient justification for failure to extend the opportunity to be
heard, when a determination of fundamental rights is to be made. See also Cohen v.
Bd, of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 238, 97 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1971); Hart v. Superior
Ct., 16 Ariz. App. 184, 492 P.2d 433 (1972).
54. 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1971).
55. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (1965).
56. Order of the Social Service Department of April 8, 1971.
57. City of New York v. Wyman, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
58. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
59. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
60. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wisc. 1970) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per
curiam), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3151 (1970).
61. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1971).
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nesses, service of subpoenae duces tecum, and attendance of witnesses at
trial-all at government expense.
In Wilson v. Wilson6 2 a Pennsylvania court followed Boddie in allowing
an indigent plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in a divorce proceeding,
but felt that Boddie did not require the state to furnish legal and investiga-
tive assistance as the defendant had requested. The Delaware Supreme
Court63 denied an indigent leave to file an appeal without posting bond in a
landlord-tenant case. The court held, over a strong dissent, that once a trial
has been afforded the indigent, due process has been satisfied. If Boddie's
progeny follow the path of the criminal cases this reasoning will not long
survive.64
A Massachusetts court was influenced by Boddie in Damaskos v. Board
of Appeal of Boston,65 where residents sought review of a Board of Appeal
decision granting a zoning variance. The grantee of the variance moved
that the residents be required to post a bond pursuant to the statute.66 The
residents contended that the bond requirement (in this case $50,000) im-
posed an unconstitutional limitation on open and equal access to the courts.
The court said that while bonds are required in other situations, e.g. replevin,
trusteeships, and appeals, they were required only after some prior judicial,
as opposed to administrative, process. In a zoning appeal case, initial ac-
cess to the court was at stake. However, the court construed the statutory
requirement to be somewhat akin to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c),
which requires a bond but allows the court to decide what amount is proper.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial c3urt to set the bond
amount.
Thus, while the Boddie decision itself applied only to divorce proceedings,
its rationale can, and should, be applied to any situation in which the court
or tribunal is the sole means of settlement. For, it would seem that in any
situation in which a plaintiff's fundamental rights are at stake, the Boddie
decision demands that he be given unrestricted access to the appropriate
forum, regardless of his wealth. But, to date courts have been reluctant to
extend the doctrine to certain situations without further direction from the
Supreme Court. The Court's own attitude toward the extension of Boddie
has been somewhat ambiguous. Shortly after the Boddie decision came
down, the Court denied certiorari67 to a group of cases seeking to extend the
62. 218 Pa. Super. 344, 280 A.2d 665 (1971).
63. State ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols, 281 A.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
64. Compare Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972)
with Jones v. Aciz, 289 A.2d 44 (1972).
65. 267 N.E.2d 897 (1971).
66. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 665, § 11 (1956).
67. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
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doctrine, yet noted probable jurisdiction in one, 68 and vacated and re-
manded two others 9 for reconsideration in light of Boddie. As to the two
cases being remanded, Frederick v. Schwartz involved an indigent in a wel-
fare case who could not pay fees necessary to docket an appeal, and Sloat-
man v. Gibbons was a divorce case similar to Boddie except that Arizona
permits an extension of time for the indigent to pay the statutory fee. In
Lindsey v. Normet, one of the cases which was granted certiorari, an in-
digent who could not afford to post the penalty bond required to appeal an
adverse judgment in an eviction suit, sought to proceed in forma pauperis.
Of the other cases in which certiorari was denied,70 four involve situations
similar to the cases which were remanded. If the attitude of the Court is
that the doctrine of civil in forma pauperis proceedings should be gradually
evolved, the Court's action as to these cases is understandable. The sur-
prising case, however, is an indigent mother who was denied court ap-
pointed counsel to defend her against a state civil suit to declare her an unfit
mother and take away five of her seven children. This case appears to fit
exactly into the Boddie mold since the separation of mother and child is cer-
tainly "fundamental" and the matter rests squarely within state control.
Mr. Justice Douglas expressed the feeling that all the cases under consid-
eration should be reversed outright and the petitioners therein allowed, as
of right, to proceed in forma pauperis. Mr. Justice Black, who dissented
in Boddie, felt that the cases should be set for argument or reversed out-
right because "[tihere is simply no fairness or justice in a legal system which
pays indigents' costs to get divorces and does not aid them in other civil cases
which are frequently of far greater importance to society." 71 Since the denial
of certiorari should, theoretically, have no bearing on the matter one way
or the other it is difficult to define what direction the Supreme Court will
take in subsequent cases of this type.
Federal Courts
The most frequent criteria used to determine indigency in the federal courts
is aptly stated in Bramlett v. Peterson:12
The determination of indigency rests in the sound discretion of the
68. Lindsey v. Normet, No. 6158, cert. denied, Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.,
402 U.S. 954, 955 (1971).
69. Frederick v. Schwartz, No. 5050; Sloatman v. Gibbons, No. 5067, cert. denied in
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955 (1971).
70. In re Garland No. 5971, see also note 30; Borbeau v. Lancaster, No. 5054;
Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., No. 5208; Kaufman v. Carter, No. 6375,
cert. denied in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
71. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 960 (1971).
72. 307 F. Supp. 1311, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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court, but it should take into consideration whether the accused
has a family or other dependents and how many, if the accused is
presently employed or is on welfare, whether he has income ....
what amount, if any, he has in checking or savings accounts, the
extent of any indebtedness, . . . whether he has adequate assets
not presently encumbered or otherwise unavailable. 73
The federal courts have generally followed the dicta in Adkins v. E. L Du-
Pont De Nemours & Co.74 to the effect that one need not be penniless to
proceed in forma pauperis.
While the determination of indigency rests in the "sound discretion of the
court," there are limits to the exercise of this discretion. In Harris v. Har-
ris,75 the plaintiff petitioned under the D.C. Code76 to be allowed to waive
the $100 filing fee in a divorce proceeding. In the principal case, Mrs. Har-
ris supported herself and two children on the $70 a week she received from
private employment. In the companion case (Parks v. Parks) Mrs. Parks
supported herself and five children on $220 a month received from the De-
partment of Public Welfare. The lower court, referring to Mrs. Harris' state-
ment that she earned $70 a week take home pay, said that her ". . allega-
tion of poverty is belied by her own statement," and refused her permission
to proceed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia circuit felt that such a summary dismissal of Mrs. Parks' claim to pov-
erty was improper and stated that the true test was that laid down by Mr.
Justice Black in Adkins:
We cannot agree . . . that one must be absolutely destitute to enjoy
the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which
states that one cannot because of his poverty "pay or give security
for costs . . . and still be able to provide" himself and dependents
"with the necessities of life."'77
While this statement was an interpretation of the federal In Forma Pauperis
Statute, 78 the court gave the D.C. Code provision the same reading.
73. Id. at 1323.
74. 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
75. 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
76. D.C. CODE § 15-712 (1967).
77. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. at 339.
78. 28 U.S.C. 1915(a). The statutes are similar when read together: D.C. CoDE
§ 15-712. Waiver of prepayment of costs in Court of General Sessions.
When satisfactory evidence is presented to the District of Columbia Court of Gen-
eral Sessions or one of the judges thereof that the plaintiff in a suit is indigent and
unable to make deposit of costs, the court or judge may permit the prosecution of the
suit without the prepayment or deposit of costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Proceedings in forma pauperis.
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes an affi-
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Although the briefs of both appealing parties suggested constitutional is-
sues, the court, deferring to the Supreme Court, which had at that time
noted probable jurisdiction in Boddie,79 based its decision solely on statutory
construction. Now that Boddie is law, it is uncertain how the definition of
indigency will be affected. It is possible that some courts, fearing an influx
of indigents seeking access to the courts, may be hesitant to define "indi-
gency" as broadly as they have previously done. To date this writer has been
unable to find any federal post-Boddie decisions indicating a trend in either
direction.
State Courts
In the state courts, there is some indication that in cases based on the Boddie
theory the courts will impose a high standard for determination of indigency.
In Wilson v. Wilson,80 a divorce case, the Pennsylvania court held that
where the husband ". . . (1) has no cash, collateral, or property and is un-
able to pay the costs of a divorce proceeding, and (2) is confined in a state
prison, has only minimal income provided by prison wages" and is able to
demonstrate this satisfactorily to the trial court, then it would be a denial
of due process to prevent the petitioner from proceeding in forma pauperis.
This standard is considerably more strict than Mr. Justice Black's "allegation
of poverty" criterion set forth in Adkins."' The court in Wilson also refused
to expand Boddie by denying the petitioner's request for legal and investiga-
tive assistance from the state.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Coonce v. Coonce,82 considered a
case similar to, but decided before, Boddie. It is an extreme example of the
fate which may befall the progeny of Boddie. Mrs. Coonce, the plaintiff,
wished to proceed in an action for divorce but maintained that, by reason
of indigency, she was unable to pay the $15 filing fee. As proof of her
indigency she submitted an affidavit stating that she had five children ranging
in age from one to eight, that she receives Aid for Families with Dependent
Children in the amount of $158.15 biweekly, and that she would be unable
to pay the $15 filing fee without depriving her children of the necessities of
life. There were no counter-affidavits presented to the court; indeed, the
evidence was not questioned as to its accuracy. However, the lower court
davit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall
state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled
to redress.
79. 395 U.S. 974 (1969).
80. Wilson v. Wilson, 218 Pa. Super. 344, 280 A.2d 665 (1971).
81. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
82. 365 Mass. 690, 255 N.E.2d 330 (1970).
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found, and the supreme court affirmed, that the allegations presented were
insufficient, as a factual matter, to prove her indigency. "As the recipient of
non-taxable support payments at the rate of $79 weekly, together with free
medical expenses, the Court finds the petitioner not 'destitute'. ' 83
The court admitted that the probate court, in which the case was originally
brought, had the power under the statute84 to waive fees for indigents in this
type of a case, but it avoided the issue by the simple expedient of declaring
her "not indigent." Yet, the supreme court did not feel bound by the trial
court's decision and decided the issue of indigency for itself unfavorably to
the plaintiff.8 5 The plaintiff contended that since the "authorities" had al-
ready declared her to be eligible for AFDC benefits and for receipt of OEO
services, she is automatically eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. The
court declined to surrender the right to make such a determination for itself.
Indeed, it is doubtful that many state courts will allow federal agencies or
federal courts to set the standards of indigency to be applied by the state
courts.
Now that Boddie has raised the ability to proceed in forma pauperis to the
dignity, in certain cases at least, of a constitutional right, a restrictive defi-
nition of indigency may be the only means of circumvention available to
those courts which are reluctant to follow the doctrine.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut will most certainly
be regarded as a landmark in a long line of decisions expanding the rights
of indigents in criminal and civil litigation. Depending on one's point of
view, it is either the affirmation of a constitutional principle long in need of
recognition, or a decision likely to clog the already overcrowded civil courts
with a flood of litigation spurred by its cost free availability. Its importance
and impact, however, cannot be denied.
The prospects for the expansion of the Boddie rationale are great. If
the logic of the Boddie decision is carried to its ultimate conclusion it seems
inescapable that eventually indigent litigants will be supplied with profes-
sional legal assistance, cost free access to all determinative tribunals, free
transcripts, and free service of process in most types of civil litigation.
Mr. Justice Black, who dissented in Boddie, said in a later Supreme Court
decision, ". . . if the decision in that case [Boddie] is to continue to be the
83. Id. at 691, 255 N.E.2d at 331 (1970).
84. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 33; ch. 262, §§ 4, 40 (Supp. 1972).
85. Coonce v. Coonce, 365 Mass. at 692, 255 N.E.2d at 332: "We . . . stand
where the trial judge stood and consider the same question unaffected by his decision."
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law, it cannot be restricted to persons seeking a divorce. It is bound to be
extended to all civil cases." 86 Mr. Justice Douglas would extend the doc-
trine's coverage to administrative procedures as well. "[O]btaining a fresh
start in life through bankruptcy proceedings or securing adequate housing
and other procedures [are fundamental rights. Refusal to allow an indigent
to proceed cost free in these cases would] . . . seemingly violate the Equal
Protection Clause."87
Presumably it will take years to extend this doctrine to encompass all
types of civil cases and administrative proceedings. Cost free legal assistance
was not directly affected by the Boddie decision and, because of the rela-
tively high financial burden it will place upon the states, it is not a viable
prospect in the near future. But if the path which the legal rights of the
indigent followed in the criminal courts is any guide, once a case like Boddie
has been decided by the Supreme Court, there can be no retreat from the
inevitable.
The late Mr. Justice Black can no longer implement the doctrine of Boddie,
but his expression of that doctrine is the most eloquent and the one best
prophesying the direction it is likely to take in the future:
In my view, the decision . . .can . . .rest on only one crucial
foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of
the States belong to the people of this country and that no person
can be denied access to those courts, either for trial or an appeal,
because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or
afford to hire an attorney . . . In my judgment Boddie cannot
and should not be limited to either its facts or its language, and I
believe there can be no doubt that this country can afford to pro-
vide court costs and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by
their poverty from resort to the law for resolution of their dis-
putes. 8
John C. Heffernan
86. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971) (Black, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 961 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
88. Id. at 955-56 (Black, J. dissenting).
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